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This note proposes a growth model that is derived from the standard
Solow growth model by replacing the neoclassical production function with
Kaldor’s technical progress function while maintaining a marginalist theory
of factor prices in the spirit suggested by von Weizsäcker (, b). The
hybrid model so obtained explains balanced growth in a way that appears less
arbitrary than possible explanations in the Solow model, especially because it
directly accounts for Harrod neutral technical change, without any need for
further assumptions. It complements the current neoclassical and AK models
by offering a further perspective for interpreting economic growth.
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Most growth models - whether orthodox (neoclassical, AK) or heterodox (post-
Keynesian, neo-Kaleckian, Classical, neo-Marxist) assume that technical change is
purely labor augmenting, or “Harrod neutral”. For many questions analyzed with
the aid of these models, such an assumption is perfectly legitimate, as it is sensible
to focus on a certain topic and rule out other problems, such as issues relating to
the direction of technical change.
Yet the assumption of Harrod neutrality is critical in the sense that the direction
of technical change – whether capital augmenting or capital reducing (“Marx-
biased”) – will substantially affect most conclusions drawn, unless production
technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function, where labor
augmentation and capital augmentation are indistinguishable. Capital reducing
technical change combined with a bounded savings rate could eventually induce
stagnation, for instance, and may drive the shares of labor and capital to extremes,
which seems hardly compatible with what we have observed in the past. Likewise,
capital augmenting technical change may drive the shares of labor and capital to
extreme values and may generate explosive rather than exponential growth.
Such problems are avoided by directly assuming from the outset either a Cobb-
Douglas production function or Harrod-neutral technical change. Both assump-
tions refer, however, to highly singular, and, in this sense, utterly improbable cases.
Regarding the Cobb-Douglas assumption, justifications like those by Houthakker
() or Jones () require quite specific assumptions about the “input-output
distribution” or the “distribution of ideas”. Such distributional assumptions appear
as singular as the direct Cobb-Douglas assumption itself. Further, the Cobb-
Douglas assumption has been criticized on empirical grounds, as many studies
suggest an elasticity of substitution different from unity. This would rule out the
Cobb-Douglas case. (The development of the CES production function by Arrow
et al. () was motivated by such empirical findings. Antras () provides
up-to-date references and new estimates.)
Regarding Harrod-neutrality, von Weizsäcker (/, a) and Kennedy
() have postulated a mechanism that may produce purely labor augmenting
technical change and thereby reduce the arbitrariness of the assumption. They posit
that factor prices govern the direction of technical change. The more abundant
factor will become cheaper and technical progress will be directed towards increas-
 For orthodox growth models, see Aghion and Howitt (), for heterodox growth models, see
Setterfield ().

ing the efficiency of the other, now increasingly scarce, factor. This mechanism
has been added to the basic neoclassical model by von Weizsäcker (/),
Samuelson (), and Drandakis and Phelps () to rationalize Harrod neutral-
ity. (Kennedy () and von Weizsäcker (a) employ a Leontief production
function.) The Kennedy-Weizsäcker mechanism has more recently gained renewed
attention (Acemoglu b, , Ch. ).
Another approach is feasible, however, that builds on von Weizsäcker’s (;
b, Ch. iii) critique of Kaldor’s () growth theory and has been sketched
in a different context in Schlicht (, Sect. .). It is obtained by replacing
the neoclassical production function in the standard Solow () growth model
by Kaldor’s () “technical progress function” and by employing a theory of
distribution that flows from the assumption that firms select a cost minimizing rate
of capital deepening. This theory of distribution, although marginalist in spirit,
does not relate to marginal productivities, which do not exist in this construction,
nor is it compatible with any Cambridge (post-Keynesian) theory of distribution.
The “hybrid” model that will be outlined in the following combines Kaldor’s
() technical progress function with a Leontief production function and delivers
Harrod-neutral technical change. It criss-crosses neoclassical and Post-Keynesian
strands of though and turns von Weizsäcker’s (; b, Ch. iii) criticism of
Kaldor’s () growth theory into a positive theory.
As von Weizsäcker’s criticism of Kaldor’s () growth theory is, it appears to
me, unduly disregarded, all this may be of some historical interest. Further, the
hybrid model offers several advantages over other more recent approaches:
• The central assumption – that capital deepening induces an increase in labor
productivity – appears to me intuitively quite convincing and less arbitrary,
or singular, as compared to the alternative assumptions encountered in the
literature: Cobb-Douglas, Harrod neutrality, or an invariant innovation
possibility function.
• I assume that firms select the rate of capital deepening such as to maxi-
mize the decrease in unit costs. In this I follow von Weizsäcker (/),
Kennedy (), and other earlier theories. I call this “gradient cost mini-
mization”. It permits an analytically very transparent and simple analysis but
has been criticized recently as a heuristic theoretical shortcut and, essentially,
an arbitrary optimization procedure that does not meet modern analytical
standards and was enforced on the economists of the s by their lack of
appropriate theoretical tools (Acemoglu a, , Jones , ). Such

an assessment needs to be revised, though, as it can be shown that gradi-
ent cost minimization is, in equilibrium, equivalent to present value cost
minimization, and both minimization procedures entail analogical results
outside equilibrium. (This has been suspected by Samuelson (, ) and
is proved in Appendix .)
• The joint use of a production function and an innovation possibility function,
as in the neoclassical versions of the induced technical change literature
going back to von Weizsäcker (/) and Samuelson () involves the
problem of empirically separating substitution between labor and capital
along the production function from substitution that occurs through a bias
in technical change. This problem is absent in the theory to be presented, as
no distinction is made between investment in machinery and investment in
technology.
• Several authors have suggested that the possibility of substitution between
capital and labor may be limited in the short run but could be ample in the
long run (Johansen , Foley and Michl , Sect. ., Jones , Jones
, Michl , Ch. , León-Ledesma and Satchi ). The hybrid model
features this idea by combining fixed proportions in the short run with the
possibility of substitution between capital and labor in the long run, through
technical progress.
• Productivity growth, while positively associated with accumulation as in AK
models, can also occur without accumulation, as in neoclassical models. The
hybrid model offers, therefore, a middle ground between these extremes.
• It is sometimes emphasized that marginal productivity theory implies, to-
gether with a neoclassical production function, factor exhaustion: the prod-
uct is distributed in its entirety to labor and capital and nothing is left to
reward investment in technological progress: As a consequence, the neoclas-
sical growth model is sometimes considered unsuited to explain endogenous
growth (Nordhaus ,  Aghion and Howitt , ). In the hybrid
model this problem does not occur because investment in capital and knowl-
edge occur jointly, as in some AK models and also in the earlier neoclassical
models of endogenous growth by Conlisk (, ) and Vogt ().
• In addition, the model offers a rather transparent way to highlight the funda-
mental incompatibility of a cost minimizing assumption with an indepen-
dent investment function. In neoclassical models the problem is typically

sidestepped by assuming that savings determine investment, and this model-
ing strategy is followed here in the basic model. In post-Keynesian models,
the problem is avoided by disregarding that the market mechanism pushes
for cost minimization. Yet both assumptions – cost minimization, and an
independent investment function – appear mandatory components of any
sensible growth theory, which poses a fundamental problem that any growth
theory has to face. This “overdetermination” problem will be outlined with
regard to the hybrid model and its neoclassical twin in Section ..
As a caveat, let me add that this paper takes just one element of just one of Kaldor’s
approaches to economic growth and transplants it, as it were, into an alien patch.
It is expressly not intended to do justice to Kaldor’s broader view, nor to any other
approach to economic growth that is mentioned. (For references on Kaldor’s
contributions to economic growth, see King ().)
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the hybrid model.
Section  discusses some modeling question: how the hybrid model accounts for
balanced growth in a more natural way than its neoclassical twin (Sections . - .);
that the concept of capital appropriate for the hybrid model differs from the usual
one (Section .); and that the overdetermination problem remains unresolved
(Section .). Section  provides a conclusion.
 A Hybrid Model
. The Technical Progress Function
Consider a closed economy with two factors of production, labor N and capital
K . Denote output by Y and labor productivity by y = Y
N
. The development of
labor productivity over time depends on the amount of capital employed per
worker, denoted by k = K
N
. The more the capital-labor ratio increases, the more
will labor productivity increase, but even without any such capital deepening, labor
productivity will increase somewhat. As Kaldor (, ) put it, “some increases
in productivity would take place even if capital per man remained constant over
time, since there are always some innovations – improvements in factory lay-out
and organization, for example – which enable production to be increased without
additional investment”.
 I take the term “hybrid model” from Marglin () who used it for a number of different models.
The present model may be added to his list.

The “technical progress function” formalizes these ideas. It gives the growth rate
of labor productivity as an increasing function of capital deepening. Denoting time
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For k̂ = 0 (a constant capital-labor ratio), the increase in labor productivity is
positive, and it is increasing in capital deepening, but these increases are subject
to diminishing returns. As Kaldor (, ) explains, “there is likely to be some
maximum beyond which the rate of growth in productivity could not be raised,
however fast capital is being accumulated.” Hence the technical progress function
“is likely to be convex upwards and flatten out altogether beyond a certain point.”
These assumptions are formalized for the present purposes as follows:
ϕ (0) > 0, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ < 0, ϕ′ (∞) = 0.
The technical progress function is depicted in Figure . It embodies the idea that
capital accumulation and technical progress occur jointly. The idea has been taken
up (and acknowledged) by Arrow (). It re-surfaced in some more recent AK
theories, often in truncated form, namely that “aggregate productivity depends
upon the aggregate capital stock”. In contrast, Kaldor assumes that even without
capital accumulation, productivity increases over time. This is is known as the
“Horndal effect” and appears to be an empirical regularity. In this sense, Kaldor
takes an intermediate position between the extremes of purely endogenous and
purely exogenous technical progress, as encountered in the modern literature
(Aghion and Howitt, , Chs.  and ). Further, the technical progress function
is assumed to be convex (ϕ′′ < 0). If it were linear, it could be integrated and into
a Cobb-Douglas production function (Hahn and Matthews, , ). But the
Cobb-Douglas production technology seems to be ruled out by empirical findings
(Antras, ). So convexity appears to be an economically sensible assumption that
has apparently obtained some empirical support (Bairam, ). Note, however,
 Aghion and Howitt (, ). Basically the AK approach can be characterized by a production
function with constant returns to scale of the form Y = F (AN ,K ) with the efficiency of labor A
being a function of K . This rules out Lundberg’s () Horndal effect.
 See Lundberg (), Ohlin (), David (), Lazonick and Brush (), Hendel and Spiegel
(). This is also to be found in Verdoorn’s Law where where labor productivity is held to increase







Figure : The technical progress function ϕ gives the increase in labor productivity ŷ as a function
of capital deepening k̂.
that a convex technical progress function cannot be integrated into a neoclassical
production function (Hahn and Matthews, , ). So it should be possible, in
principle, to empirically check which view fits the facts better. Unfortunately, and
to the best of my knowledge, this has never been tried.
Given labor productivity y > 0 and capital productivity x > 0, production can
now be described by a Leontief production function
Y = min
{
y N , xK
}
()
Both productivities, x and y , will vary over time, and the technical progress function
can be employed to describe these changes within an otherwise standard growth
framework.
Assume that labor grows with a rate ν≥ 0, the savings rate s is constant and
positive (s > 0), and the rate of depreciation δ is constant and positive as well (δ> 0).
Full employment of labor and capital implies y N = xK = Y . We start from such a
 So the coefficients in the Leontief production function () are assumed fixed in the short run, but
can vary in the long run. This embodies Johansen’s () idea of ex post fixed and ex ante variable
proportions in a non-vintage model.

situation. With a savings rate s, savings are S = sY and the change in the capital
stock is savings S minus depreciation δK .
K̇ = sY −δK . ()
Dividing this by K and noting Y = xK , yields
K̂ = sx −δ.
From this we obtain the rate of capital deepening k̂ as
k̂ = sx −δ−ν ()
which is the Solow equation, or accumulation equation, encountered in the stan-
dard growth model (Solow, , eq. ). It gives the rate of capital deepening as a
function of the output-capital ratio.






its growth rate is
x̂ = ŷ − k̂. ()
The technical progress function () gives the increase in labor productivity as a
function of the rate of capital deepening. Hence the growth of capital productivity






Since the accumulation equation () gives the rate of capital deepening as a function
of the output-capital ratio, we obtain finally
x̂ =ϕ (sx −δ−ν)− (sx −δ−ν) . ()
This is a first-order autonomous differential equation that describes the develop-
ment of capital productivity x over time. It can be analyzed easily.
Without capital deepening capital productivity is x = 1
s (δ+ν). Hence capital
productivity grows at the rate x̂ =ϕ (0) which is positive. On the other hand, for a










− k̂ is dominated by the second term








< 0). In the context of equation () this
translates into limx→∞ {x̂} < 0. For continuity reasons there must exist a rate of














Figure : Capital deepening changes over time according to the difference between the change in




and the rate of capital deepening k̂. For values of k̂ below γ, k̂ increases
and for values of k̂ above γ, k̂ decreases. The equilibrium at k̂ = γ is stable.





















definite, and the root is unique.









At this output-capital ratio we have x̂ = 0; so x̄ is an equilibrium (critical point)
of our differential equation (). If the rate of capital deepening is γ, the output-
capital ratio is such that the rate of capital deepening is equal to γ; further the
output-capital ratio will remain constant at x = x̄ over time.
Because
(
ϕ (sx −δ−ν)− (sx −δ−ν)
)
(x − x̄) is negative definite, the equilib-
rium x̄ is globally stable (in the sense of being asymptotically stable). Given any
initial value of x, capital productivity will approach this equilibrium value over time.
In equilibrium, capital productivity x will remain at x = x̄ and labor productivity
will increase by ŷ = γ. This is illustrated in Figure 

. The Direction of Technical Change
It is interesting to discuss the previous analysis within a standard framework, even
if this does not do full justice to Kaldor’s ideas.
Looking at the production function (), x̂ can be interpreted as the rate of
capital augmenting technical change and ŷ can be interpreted as the rate of labor
augmenting technical change. The difference ŷ − x̂ is the Hicksian bias in technical
progress and x̂ is the Harrod bias – it gives the deviation from Harrod neutral
technical progress (x̂ = 0), either capital augmenting (x̂ > 0) or capital reducing
(x̂ < 0). From () it can be seen that the Hicksian bias equals the rate of capital
deepening and the Harrod bias is a function of capital deepening. In particular, for
k̂ < γ, technical progress is capital augmenting and for k̂ > γ it is capital reducing.
In this sense, the rate of capital deepening determines the direction of technical
change.
If we follow Kaldor and assume that the rate of capital deepening is determined
by the supply of savings in relation to population growth, the outcome will always
tend to Harrod neutral technical change. In this sense, the technical progress
function, embedded in a neoclassical framework, offers an alternative mechanism
for generating Harrod-neutral technical change.
. Factor Prices and the Choice of Technique
While the equilibrium discussed in Section  has been derived without reference
to factor prices (the wage rate and the rate of interest), this does not imply that
factor prices are irrelevant for equilibrium. Rather, any equilibrium must be
compatible with cost minimization, and this implies specific factor prices. A simple
way to discuss this in the hybrid model is obtained by importing von Weizsäcker’s
(/) and Kennedy’s () reasoning about cost minimization (or growth
maximization) and assume that a firm that faces a choice between capital widening
and capital deepening will try to settle for a combination of both that maximizes
the decline in unit costs.
 Foley and Michl (, Ch. ) refer to x̂ < 0 that occurs at k̂ < γ as “Marx biased” technical
change.
 This kind of cost minimization may be termed “gradient cost minimization”, as opposed to
”present value cost minimization,” i.e. the minimization of the present value of total costs. It has
been proposed by Kennedy () and von Weizsäcker (/) and is employed here mainly
because of its simplicity and transparency. It carries some intuitive appeal because competition
may be envisaged as a gradient process. Appendix  shows that present value cost minimization is
equivalent to gradient cost minimization in equilibrium. Outside equilibrium, both forms of cost

The technical progress function implies that the firms have a choice between
capital widening and capital deepening, and this will affect their costs. A certain
amount of money can be invested in order to increase the number of workplaces
while keeping the amount of capital invested in each workplace constant. This
would be the case of pure capital widening. The capital-labor ratio would be left
unchanged, and technical change would be Hicks-neutral. The other possibility is
to invest into the existing workplaces in order to make them more productive. This
would amount to capital deepening. Depending on the rate of capital deepening,
the direction of technical change may turn out as capital augmenting (k̂ < γ),
Harrod-neutral (k̂ = γ), or capital reducing (k̂ > γ). The individual firm faces, thus,
a trade-off between the rates of labor and capital augmentation.
Unit costs z are the sum of labor cost and capital user costs per unit. Denote the
real wage rate by w , the real rate of interest by r and the rate of capital depreciation
by δ. These are taken by the firm as exogenously given. Hence labor costs per unit
are w
y
and capital user costs per unit are r+δ
x






















In view of equations () and (), the change in unit costs over time is then deter-















The firms take the factor prices, as well as their changes over time, as exogenous and
aim to maximize the decline of unit costs over time. This amounts to minimizing
minimization lead to quite similar results in the sense that they induce biases in the same direction,
but the bias is more pronounced, or “faster”, with gradient cost minimization than with with present
value cost minimization.
 This trade-off has been formalized in von Weizsäcker’s (/) “new technical progress
function” and Kennedy’s () “innovation possibility function”. Its inverse is used in Appendix .
Kennedy himself has noted the connection of the innovation possibility function and Kaldor’s
technical progress function: “Surprisingly enough . . . our innovation possibility function is really a
disguised form of Kaldor’s famous technical progress function. . . . if the technical progress function









k̂ by selecting an appropriate rate of capital deepening













< 0 is satisfied.
With free entry, competition will eliminate pure profits, and unit costs will be









results. The expression r+δ
x
gives the share of capital costs in total costs. Equation
() determines the optimal rate of capital deepening by the condition that the
slope of the technical progress function equals the profit share π= r+δ
x







This is the condition given by von Weizsäcker (/, ) and Kennedy (,
) for an optimal choice of the direction of technical change in a different guise.
We may think that such choices will be made by different firms. As the technical
progress function is assumed to be convex (ϕ′′ < 0), equation () tells us that an
increase in capital’s share will reduce the rate of capital deepening, and an increase
in labor’s share – the complement to capital’s share – will increase the rate of capital
deepening selected by each firm. This carries over to the aggregate. In equilibrium,
capital’s share π is given by the slope of the technical progress function at the
equilibrium growth rate γ (Figure ).
The hybrid growth model can be described by the two equations () and ()
which give the system
x̂ = ϕ (sx −δ−ν)− (sx −δ−ν) ()
π = ϕ′ (sx −δ−ν) . ()
 This applies also to monopolistic competition with free entry – Chamberlin’s () tangency
solution. With a positive markup m, unit costs would be z = 1
1+m





= (1+m) r+δx .


















Figure : At the stable rate of capital deepening k̂ = γ the equilibrium profit share π equals the slope





The equation () may be further rationalized by considering the following
adjustment process. Denote the inverse function of the first derivative of the
technical progress function by κ (·). This amounts to
ϕ′ (κ (π)) =π.
Hence κ (π) gives the rate of capital deepening desired by the firms if the profit
share is π. As ϕ′′π′ = 1 and ϕ′′ < 0, we have κ′ < 0. The desired rate of capital
deepening is a decreasing function of the profit share. If we postulate that a supply
of capital deepening k̂ in excess of the desired rate of capital deepening κ (π) entails
an excess supply of capital relative to labor, capital costs will decline and the profit






for some speed of adjustment µ> 0. As ∂π̇∂π =−µκ
′ < 0, a sufficiently high speed of
adjustment µ guarantees that this adjustment to any time path of k̂ is stable.









is a partial Ljapunov function for (). Together they satisfy
the requirements for the moving equilibrium theorem given in Schlicht (, ). Hence the system
(), () is globally asymptotically stable.

 Discussion
. Kaldor’s Stylized Facts
Kaldor’s () has listed a number of “stylized facts” about economic growth.
These facts provide the starting point for neoclassical growth theory. It has been
suggested that any theory of growth should, as a first approximation, account for
these “facts” – it should be able account for balanced growth (Durlauf and Johnson
, Barro and i Martin , -). Regardless of whether this is considered
a sensible modelling requirement or not, it is interesting to note that the hybrid
model (), () accounts for these “facts” easily, without the need for additional
assumptions:
. The capital/output ratio remains roughly constant. (Capital productivity x





, see () and Figure .)
. The profit share remains roughly constant. (As x converges to x̄, the profit




, see equation (). This implies also that labor’s
share 1−π remains constant.)
. The growth of labor productivity remains roughly constant. (It tends to γ,
see Figure .)
. The capital-labor ratio grows at a roughly constant rate. (It grows with
sx̄ −δ−ν= γ, see Figure .)
. The rate of return on investment remains roughly constant over










. The real wage grows over time. (As labor’s share w
y
remains constant, the real
wage w will grow with the same rate as labor productivity y ; both grow with
γ.)
Thus the hybrid model presented here actually implies Kaldor’s “facts.” A further
“fact” may be added to Kaldor’s list and is implied by the hybrid model:
. The share of profits is less than  per cent. (The technical progress function
must cut the -degree line from above. Its slope at the intersection gives the
profit share π and must be less than .5, see Figure ().) This proposition is
empirically supported (Giovannoni, ).

The requirement that a growth model should be able to account for the above
stylized facts does not imply, of course, that growth is always balanced. The increase
in the profit share observed over the last decades suggest otherwise and requires
suitable modifications (Rodriguez and Jayadev , Schneider ). In this regard,
the hybrid model does not differ from other models that deliver, in their elementary
form, balanced growth. It has been suggested, for instance, that a proper distinction
between productive capital and financial wealth may help to explain such devel-
opments (Vollrath, ), but a discussion of such matters outranges the present
compass.
. The Neoclassical Twin
Much insight can be gained by abandoning model monism and interpreting actual
growth processes from several perspectives, such as the neoclassical or AK. This is
nicely done in Aghion and Howitt (), for example. The hybrid model offers a
third perspective that may complement the others for such purposes.
The differences between the three approaches relate mainly to the modeling
of production and technological change, because all three approaches don’t differ
much with regard to consumer behavior: consumers who want to maximize lifetime
utility (or something else) are, in a steady state, basically faced with the same data:
an exponential growth of the real wage and a fixed rate of interest. Hence their
intertemporal decisions can always be modeled in the same manner. Regarding
issues like convergence between different economies, spillovers, and the long-run
determinants of growth, these model differ somewhat, but a detailed discussion of
these matters goes beyond the scope of the present paper and must be left to future
research.
The central theoretical difference between the hybrid model and both the neo-
classical models and the AK models concerns the direction of technical change. The
problems pose themselves in similar ways in the AK models and in the neoclassical
models, but the discussion is better developed for the neoclassical case. For this
reason, it is perhaps apposite to illustrate this aspect by juxtaposing the hybrid
model and an analogous neoclassical model, its “neoclassical twin”. This will be
done in the following.
The neoclassical twin of the hybrid model is obtained by replacing the Leontief
production function () by a neoclassical production function. This production
function gives output Y as a smoothly differentiable function of labor input N
and capital input K . In order to account for growth, it must be time-dependent:
Y = F (N ,K , t ) . Further, F (·) is assumed to be linear homogeneous in N and

K . This permits to define the associated per-capita production function f (·) as
f (k, t ) := F (1,k, t ) which gives per-capita production y as a function of capital
intensity k: y = f (k, t ) . As the output-capital ratio is x =
y
k
, we obtain from () the
Solow model in its standard form.
k̇ = s f (k, t )− (ν+δ)k. ()
For any given initial capital-labor ratio k0, equation () determines the time paths
of the capital-labor ratio k and labor productivity y . Although it appears that factor
prices do not enter the model (), this is not quite correct. In any equilibrium,
factor prices must be compatible with cost minimization. Given factor prices w
and r , the firms will determine a cost minimizing technique by selecting a capital
intensity that minimizes unit costs w+(r+δ)k
f (k,t )
. This implies the marginal productivity
theory according to which the profit share equals the production elasticity of capital
π=
f ′ (k, t )k
f (k, t )
. ()
This corresponds to condition () in the hybrid model. Equations (), ()
define the neoclassical twin of the hybrid model (), (). Whereas the hybrid
model accounts for Kaldor’s stylized facts without ado, this is not true for the
neoclassical twin. Indeed, the key dilemma of the neoclassical twin is that it does
not imply anything. By postulating a suitable shifting of the production function
over time, the model can be made compatible with practically all conceivable
developments, including developments that conform to Kaldor’s stylized facts. In
order to obtain time-paths that conform to those “facts,” however, it is necessary to
assume a very specific shifting of the production function over time: we need to
assume Harrod neutral technical change in the relevant range (Uzawa , Schlicht
, Jones and Scrimgeour ). The sole justification for this assumption is that
it generates time-paths that accommodate Kaldor’s facts. By this assumption the
model is tweaked to deliver the desired result. The model itself contributes nothing
in this regard. Harrod neutrality “is just a special case” (Hahn and Matthews, ,
). As Aghion and Howitt (, n) put it:
There is no good reason to think that technological change takes [the
Harrod neutral] form; it just leads to tractable steady-state results.




























This adjusted model (), () is the only formal solution that generates results





, the model is incompatible with these “facts.”
It is easy to check that the time path
k̄t = e
γt k̄0










is a solution to (). This is the balanced
growth path. Under the usual assumptions, k̄0 is unique and all solutions kt of ()
converge to kt in the sense that the ratio
kt
k̄t
approaches one for t →∞. 





appears arbitrary. One way out is to assume right away that the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, but this conflicts with empirical evidence
(Antras, ). Another way out has been proposed by Irmen () who shows
that capital-augmenting technical progress can be accommodated with Kaldor’s
“facts” if adjustment costs of capital grow by a rate that happens to just compen-
sate the bias. However, this assumption appears as special as the straightforward
assumption of Harrod neutrality. A third, and perhaps more preferable, way to
reduce this arbitrariness has been proposed by von Weizsäcker (/,a)
and Kennedy (). They assume that that factor prices govern the direction of
technical change. The more abundant factor will become cheaper and technical
progress will be directed towards increasing the efficiency of the scarce factor. This
mechanism has been added to the basic neoclassical model by von Weizsäcker
(/), Samuelson (), and Drandakis and Phelps () to rationalize
 More precisely: with any other production function, equation () violates Kaldor’s “facts.” The
underlying theorem is Uzawa’s () steady state theorem. It has originally been proved under the
assumption that the marginal productivity theory () holds true. Schlicht () has shown that
the theorem can be generalized and holds true regardless of the theory of distribution employed.
In other words, the necessity of Harrod neutrality persists even if equation () that embodies the
marginal productivity theory is replaced by something else.
 See Appendix A .
 In the canonical AK model mentioned in footnote , the per-capita production would be required
to have the form y = ak which appears very arbitrary, too.

Harrod neutrality. (Kennedy () and von Weizsäcker (a) employ a Leontief
production function.)
The argument is that capital augmenting technical change would make capital
increasingly abundant and labor increasingly scarce. Technical change will therefore
tend to eventually become Harrod neutral. This argument appears problematic
because the assumption of Harrod neutrality is now replaced the “innovation pos-
sibility function” that describes the trade off between labor augmenting and capital
augmenting technical change. As this trade off at the Harrod-neutral position
determines the shares of capital and labor, the trade off is critical but there is again
no good reason to assume that this trade-off is roughly stable. Such an assump-
tion would presuppose a knowledge about trade-offs among yet unknown future
technologies.
The results “depend on the invariance over time of the innovation possibility
functions, an invariance that is . . . difficult to swallow” (Kennedy, , ). It may
even be argued that the “induced innovation . . . model has let a very restrictive
assumption slip in the back door” and that the direct macro assumption of Harrod
neutrality is preferable over the trade-off argument because both would appear
equally arbitrary, yet the former is more transparent (Nordhaus , , Schlicht
, n. ).
Further, the assumption of a neoclassical production function is open to the
criticism raised in the capital controversy of the ’sixties. This is a severe shortcoming
that has induced some leading proponents of the neoclassical growth model to turn
to Austrian capital theory (von Weizsäcker , Hicks b, a), and others
to leave the field (Samuelson ). The hybrid theory sidesteps this problem.
Kennedy (, ) saw this as an advantage of his theory of technical progress (in
its multi-sector version):
. . . the theory neatly sidesteps all the difficulties that arise when relative
prices alter as a result of changes in the rate of interest, difficulties
exemplified by the recent concern about re-switching. Since in real life
changes in relative prices are brought about much more significantly by
technical progress than by changes in the rate of interest, it is reassuring
to have a theory in which the rise in the relative price of a factor leads
unequivocally to an economy in its use!
This carries over to the hybrid model.

. The Concept of Capital
One reason for Kaldor to develop the concept of the technical progress function
relates to the concept of capital. He argues that it is not useful to separate investment
in physical capital from investment in new technologies, because both usually go
together:
. . . the present model . . . eschews any distinction between changes
in techniques (and in productivity) which are induced by changes in
the supply of capital relative to labor and those induced by technical
invention or innovation – i.e., the introduction of new knowledge.
As his reason he gives:
The use of more capital per worker (whether measured in terms of the
value of capital at constant prices, in terms of tons of weight of the
equipment, mechanical power, etc.) inevitably entails the introduction
of superior techniques which require "inventiveness" of some kind,
though these need not necessarily represent the application of basically
new principles or ideas. On the other hand, most, though not all,
technical innovations which are capable of raising the productivity
of labor require the use of more capital per man – more elaborate
equipment and/or more mechanical power
and he continues:
It follows that any sharp or clear-cut distinction between movements
along a “production function” with a given state of knowledge, and
a shift in the”production function” caused by a change in the state
of knowledge is arbitrary and artificial. Hence instead of assuming
that some given rate of increase in productivity is attributable to tech-
nical progress which is superimposed, so to speak, on the growth of
productivity attributable to capital accumulation, we shall postulate
a single relationship between the growth of capital and the growth of
productivity which incorporates the influence of both factors (Kaldor,
, f).
As a consequence, the concept of capital must be seen as involving all outlays for
investment. The idea is that investment spending is optimally allocated between
development of new technology, and the installment of new production facilities.

(Such division has been modeled in the early neoclassical endogenous growth
models by Conlisk (, ) and Vogt ().) This view seems to accord with
current business practice, as the price paid for a new machine will cover both R&D
expenditure and production costs for that product. So our statistical data lump
these expenses together. From a practical point of view it appears, thus, reasonable
to employ Kaldor’s concept of capital instead of drawing a distinction between
physical and intellectual capital.
On the other hand, not all forms of wealth accumulation are to be counted as
outlays for investment. The issuing of government debt creates financial wealth even
if productive investment remains unchanged (Schlicht, , , ). From this
point of view, the issuing of government debt should not be counted as inducing
capital deepening.
. Criticism: The Missing Investment Function and the Overdetermination
Problem
The hybrid model described in this paper has been devised and presented in a
neoclassical spirit. It does employ neither a neoclassical production function
nor marginal productivity theory, yet it shares the other central shortcoming of
the orthodox (neoclassical and AK) models: there is no independent investment
function. Rather it is assumed that the consumers’ savings decision automatically
translate into investment. In a decentralized economy, saving decisions are made
by households, however, while investment decisions are made by firms. So these
decisions are made independently of each other, and it is necessary to include in
any model of a decentralized economy a mechanism that equates savings with
investment.
Regarding the neoclassical model, Hahn and Matthews (, ) put the
criticism as follows:
In its basic form the neo-classical model depends on the assumption
that it is always possible and consistent with equilibrium that invest-
ment should be undertaken of an amount equal to full-employment
savings. The mechanism that ensures this is as a rule not specified.
Such a a negligence leads to severe problems regarding logical consistency, both of
the hybrid model and its neoclassical twin. In the following I shall simply outline
 Heterodox models meet the reverse problem: They usually include an investment function, but
neglect the desideratum of cost minimization.

this problem for both models. As the problem remains unsolved, I cannot offer
any solution, but it may become apparent that taking the problem seriously might
open interesting theoretical prospects.
The problem involved here is that, by adding another equation to a fully spec-
ified model, the model becomes “overdetermined” in the sense that it contains
more equations than unknowns (Sen , Schlicht , Marglin , ). One
solution is to introduce another variable that can assume a value such that the new
equation can be made consistent with the initial model by a suitable adjustment of
this variable. In this case, the investment function would be inessential and could
simply be dropped. Hahn and Matthews (, ) have described this approach:
Most neo-classical writers have, however, had in mind some financial
mechanism. In the ideal neo-classical world one may think of there be-
ing a certain level of the rate of interest (r) that will lead entrepreneurs,
weighing interest cost against expected profits, to carry out investment
equal to full-employment savings. In the absence of risk, etc., the
equilibrium rate of interest would equal the rate of profit on invest-
ment; otherwise the rate of profit will be higher by the requisite risk
premium.
While such an argument sounds convincing, it is feasible neither for the hybrid
model nor its neoclassical twin.







and the equilibrium output capital ratio, see equations











So there is no room for varying the rate of interest such that the volume of in-
vestment is adjusted to savings. To achieve this, two rates of interest would be
needed: one to induce the correct choice of technique, the other to induce the
correct volume of investment.
In the neoclassical twin the problem is similar. The equilibrium rate of interest















. So there is no room for
varying the rate of interest in order to adjust investment to savings here, just as in
the hybrid model.

Including a risk premium would not change matters, because the capital costs
relevant for the choice of technique will be the same as the capital costs relevant
for determining the level of investment: they are simply capital costs, whether with
or without a risk premium. From this point of view, solutions like those proposed
by Beckmann (, eq. ), von Weizsäcker (, eq. ), or Fischer (, eq. )
appear problematic.
Kaldor was aware of this problem. He thought that the technical progress func-
tion would permit getting rid of the over-determination problem by eliminating
marginal productivity theory, and many heterodox writers argued in similar ways.
Getting rid of marginal productivity theory would permit dropping the equations
that determine factor prices (equation () in the hybrid model or equation () in
the neoclassical twin) and thereby make room for the Cambridge theory of factor
prices that builds on the equalization of saving and investment. But this position
is not tenable, as von Weizsäcker (, b) has shown: the coice of technique
remains a problem in Kaldor’s original model, and heterodox models have to take
account of this problem as well.
The classical assumptions about saving and investment would avoid the over-
determination problem: if the savings rate is equal to the profit share and all profits
are re-invested, savings and investment are always equal, and the problem vanishes.
Similarly, if the social planner decides about savings and investment simultane-
ously, the problem disappears. The problem emerges only with an independent
investment function.
Yet an independent investment function seems to be required in order to make
the argument that savings and investment are adjusted to each other. The assertion
that this happens automatically is appropriate for the classical assumptions about
savings and investment, or for the planning solution (the Ramsey-Malinvaud-
Cass-Koopmans models), but inappropriate in a monetary economy where saving
decisions and investment decisions are made independently of each other by dif-
ferent actors. Many heterodox writers are aware of this issue and introduce, just
 The treatment by Blanchard and Fischer (, ) is typical for orthodox texts: “Equations (,
(), and () chracterize the behavior of the decentralized economy. Note that they are identical to
equations (), (), and () which characterze the behavior of the economy as chosen by a central
planner. Thus the dynamic behavior of the decentralzed economy will be the same as that of the
centrally planned one. Our analysis of dynamics carries over to the decentralized economy.” This
assumes that the optimal savings decisions of households translate automatically into investment
decisions by the firms. Yet this cannot be determined by profit maximization, as a neoclassical
production function with constant returns does not permit a unique profit maximum. (Acemoglu,
, -).

like Kaldor, a distributive mechanism that equates savings and investment over the
business cycle, but, to the best of my knowledge, disregard the aspect of selecting a
cost minimizing technology.
The introduction of an independent investment function may lead to interesting
prospects, though. To illustrate, consider the case that the equalization of savings
and investment requires a rate of interest r1, and that the proper choice of technique
requires a different interest rate r2 > r1. If monetary policy succeeds to establish
the interest rate r1, the desired rate of capital deepening would be too large. The
newly created jobs would be endowed with too much capital, and not enough
workplaces can be created with the given amount of investment; unemployment of
labor through capital shortage would result. In the converse case r1 > r2, the rate of
capital deepening would be too low, more jobs would be newly created than could
be manned, and a labor shortage would result.
Despite these potentially interesting and promising aspects, no systematic the-
oretical work has taken up these problems as yet and these and related ideas (for
instance, the possible role of the business cycle in solving the puzzle as in Schlicht
) remain speculation.
 Conclusion
The present note has been written in order to draw attention to Kaldor’s technical
progress function and to acknowledge it as a pioneering contribution to endogenous
growth that, although largely forgotten, provides an interesting and still relevant
alternative to current modeling. The substitution of the neoclassical production
function by Kaldor’s technical progress function in a standard growth model leads to
a hybrid model that accounts for balanced growth without any further assumptions,
while the standard growth models need to be tweaked by assumptions in a way that
amounts to assuming the result.
The proof of the pie is in the eating, however. The usefulness of the proposed
model, as that of others, will be decided by using it for analyzing questions of
interest: What determines the shape and position of the technical progress function?
How to incorporate human capital formation? How do technological spillovers
work in the context of international trade? How does optimal growth look like?
What about the knife-edge problem? What about the increase in capital’s share over
the recent decades? etc. The approach may yield answers that differ somewhat from
 On that, see Bergheim ().

those obtainable from other models, and this may help to understand the issues
better. In any case, and at the current state of analysis, I think we ought refrain
from model monism and not insist that one particular model is the correct one and
the others are wrong. Rather we should appreciate various different approaches
to growth processes in their own right and discuss empirical findings in the light
of alternative interpretations. It is hoped that the hybrid model outlined here may
broaden our theoretic menu in this regard.
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Appendix : Cost Minimization
The model (), () has been derived, mainly for analytical convenience, under
the assumption that the choice of capital deepening maximizes the decline in unit
costs at each point in time (“gradient cost minimization”). In the following the
solution for cost minimization will be provided. It will turn out that gradient cost
minimization and full cost minimization are equivalent in a steady state, but differ

outside a steady state somewhat. In this sense, the older literature that relies on
gradient cost minimization (Kennedy , Samuelson , von Weizsäcker b,
Drandakis and Phelps , Conlisk , Vogt ) as well as the approach taken
in this paper is vindicated.
We start with the problem of minimizing unit costs at some future point in
time by selecting an appropriate time-path of capital deepening. The problem
has been originally posed (but not solved) by Samuelson (, ) in his version
of the Kennedy-Weizsäcker theory. For the hybrid model it can be solved by a
straightforward variational argument.
Define the function φ that describes the Kennedy-Weizsäcker trade-off between
the growth rates of productivities for capital x̂ and labor ŷ :
ŷ =φ (x̂) . (A )















and has the properties










< 0. (A )
Consider the problem to minimize unit costs at a future date T > 0 when starting
with labor productivity y0 and capital productivity x0 at time t = 0. Wages grow
along the steady state path according to
wt = w0e
γt , (A )







= 1. (A )
The firm wants to minimize unit costs at some point in time T > 0 by selecting
suitable time-paths of the increases in productivity growth x̂ and ŷ . As these time-
paths are constrained by the trade-off (A ), the problem reduces to selecting just a

time path x̂t . This entails the time path ŷt =φ (x̂t ) of labor productivity and the
time path k̂t = ŷt − x̂t of capital deepening. For ease of notation we denote the
change in capital productivity by
ut = x̂t (A )
and take this as the control variable that is used to minimize costs at time T .
Lemma. For any given T > 0, an optimal control u∗t that minimizes unit costs at time
T over the set of piecewise continuous controls is a constant control.
Proof. With control ut , the productivities at t = T are given by
xT = x0e
∫T
0 ut d t (A )
yT = y0e
∫T
0 φ(ut )d t (A )











0 φ(ut )d t
. (A )
Assume that u∗t is optimal and consider any other possible control. It differs from
u∗t by
△t = ut −u
∗
t . (A )








This set contains all convex combinations of controls u∗t and ut . In particular it
contains u∗t (for ε= 0) and ut (for ε= 1). Given some control u
∗
t and any variation















t +ε△t−γ)d t . (A )
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t d t > 0




















△t d t = 0 (A )




































for almost all t ∈ [0,T ] and hence that u∗t is the same
for almost all t . Write this as
u∗t = ū foralmostall t ∈ [0,T ] . (A )


















, the optimal control is ut = ū < 0.








and a constant ut = ū (as implied by the Lemma), we obtain from (A ) unit costs




−(φ(ū)−γ)T . (A )

















−(φ(ū)−γ)Tφ′′ (ū) . (A )
As all terms in (A ) are strictly positive, any solution ū to ∂zT∂ū = 0 gives a unique
minimum of zT .


















T 0 ⇔ −φ′ (0)T π0
1−π0
and implies for the cost-minimizing solution ū∗





1−ϕ′ , this can be expressed in terms the technical progress function as










, it is optimal to continue
with the rate of capital deepening γ. This will keep capital productivity constant
and labor productivity growing at the rate γ. If we start with a profit share π0
that exceeds γ, it is optimal to select a rate of capital deepening less than γ that
entails growing capital productivity and a growth in labor productivity less than





would require a rate of capital
deepening exceeding γ. All this is qualitatively similar to gradient cost minimization,
but the reaction will be much less pronounced.
To see this, consider the first-order condition for the minimizing solution ū∗







= 0. (A )


































T 0 ⇔ ū∗ S 0.
Therefore a higher initial profit share leads to a higher increase in capital productiv-
ity. This goes along with smaller rate of capital deepening. Conversely a smaller
share of profits leads to a higher rate of capital deepening. The larger the planning
horizon T , the less pronounced will be this reaction.








T must remain bounded and we conclude




In other words: If the firm wants to minimize costs in the very distant future, it will
select a rate of capital deepening very close to the equilibrium rate γ.
Hence gradient cost minimization used in Section . is only optimal in the
steady state. Outside the steady state it is optimal to react to differences between





pronounced, but qualitatively similar way. This qualitative result carries over to the
minimization of the present value of total costs, as this involves minimization of a
weighted average of future costs.
Appendix : Convergence in the Neoclassical Twin
In the following, the relative convergence of different solutions to the differential
equation () describing the neoclassical twin is shown. The function f is assumed

to satisfy the Inada conditions, and ψ inherits them: ψ (0) = 0, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ < 0,

















has a positive root k̄0 that is unique, and that
ψ(ξ)




























< 0 forall ξ> 0 with ξ 6= k̄0. (A )
It is easy to check that the time-path
k̄t = e




−γt kt . (A )
Equations () and (A ) imply




ξt . (A )
Consider now the relative distance between any solution kt of () and k̄t :
Vt =
(
logkt − log k̄t
)2
.
As kt = e
γtξt and k̄t = e
γt k̄0, this is identical to
Vt =
(
logξt − log k̄0
)2
.
The time derivative of this distance is
V̇t = 2
(
























and we can write
V̇t = 2s
(












which is negative whenever ξt differs from k̄0, see (A ). Hence all solutions of
() converge in the sense that the ratio of two solutions k ′t and k
′′
t approach unity.
(This does not imply that the distance between such solutions shrinks over time.)

